v aircraft carrier has answered the nation's call an average of four times a year in response to contingency and limited war operations since World War II; there is no evidence to suspect that this trend will decrease in the foreseeable future.
Chapter 1 The Political Survival of the Aircraft Carrier
The aircraft carrier is a sitting duck in modern warfare and costs the equivalent of a bomber wing.
-An unnamed Pentagon source
As military budget debates rise in intensity an anonymous version of this statement appears annually in the media and other sources of interest to the government.
A much more common, if less quoted, statement is the question "Where is the nearest carrier?" Although there are rarely media members present in the Oval Office to record this query for the evening news, it has been asked over 200 times by every American president since Harry S. Truman took office. 1 When a political crisis erupts in some distant corner of the world, America's leadership unfailing turns to its military weapon system that has proven consistently capable of combining devastating firepower and sustained forward presence.
The aircraft carrier and its accompanying battle group have been this nation's only rapidly deployable provider of offshore deterrence since World War II. When Iraq most recently defied the United Nations in the autumn of 1997, the President sought immediately increased military presence in the Arabian Gulf. The U.S.S. Nimitz and U.S.S. George Washington aircraft carrier battle groups were only days away and rapidly proceeded to the troubled area. After weeks of negotiations by the Secretary of State with various regional heads of state, landing rights and over flight clearances were eventually obtained and expeditionary forces of the Air Force began their deployment to the region over one month after the arrival of the two aircraft carrier battle group forces.
Four months after the current crisis began, land based forces continued to send incremental forces to the gulf region-but they still did not have host nation permission to conduct any offensive actions against Iraq. Much notice has been given to the Air Force assets that have deployed to the region, but little has been realized in making those forces a genuine threat to the Iraqi leadership.
Meanwhile, the U.S.S. Independence and her battle group, to permit Nimitz to end her normal six-month deployment as scheduled, had quietly relieved the Nimitz battle group.
The two carrier battle groups and their supporting surface ships are currently available to enforce our national will. Operating in international waters and able to conduct offensive air operations without the approval or support of host nations, the carrier forces continue to maintain their indefinite presence in the gulf.
Is the day of the aircraft carrier over?
The aircraft carrier has often come under scrutiny by other services and civilian leadership, usually in times of fiscal belt-tightening. The Joint Chiefs of Staff publication Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010 ) and today's uncertain fiscal future have again brought the carrier under the "bean counter's" knife as being too costly and tactically vulnerable.
I will address this ongoing debate by demonstrating how the aircraft carrier has historically survived repeated political attack. This paper will document some of these political events including historical aircraft carrier responses to global crises, examine previously unsuccessful attempts at replacing aircraft carriers with different weapon systems and explore aircraft carrier survivability and adaptability. Further, these arguments will recall the coincidental failures or shortcomings of different forms of military applications to these historical political situations. contend that maintaining visibility does not require a forward presence; they believe the "virtual presence" of a deadly force such as intercontinental bombers reflects the same political will as a deployed and on site lethal force.
Joint Vision 2010 -Concept for
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Others contend that the lack of a forward presence translates into "actual absence" in the hearts and minds of those who we wish to influence. Vice Admiral Thomas Fargo, speaking of forward-deployed carriers while Commander of the Fifth Fleet said, "Presence and deterrence are about being visible to both friend and foe -here for peace, yet ready and able to support our friends."
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The history of our last fifty years has tested both sides of the coin on several occasions. Invariably, when relying upon weapon systems that were attempting to substitute for the carrier role, those replacement systems have failed to deliver as advertised. Often, carrier forces had to then become involved to salvage the situation. Empire" of the Soviet Union, our greatest adversary during the protracted Cold War, is now our ally in free enterprise.
We can no longer blindly assume that we will enjoy international support in future conflicts. Our long lost facilities in Libya, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippine Islands lay as mute testimony to the fallacy of relying on host nation cooperation in support of our national objectives. Korea became more unstable than usual in the summer of 1994, but this time no carriers were deployed to the region under the assumption that adequate U.S. forces were ashore there and in Japan. Anticipating the requirement for reinforcement if hostilities occurred, four carriers were put on a two-week tether to guarantee the arrival of 248 strike aircraft if escalation occurred. 7 This allowed the four carriers to be employed elsewhere with a guaranteed response still being available to the theater commander.
Operation Restore Democracy came into being in 1994 as well, notably marking the use of the America and Eisenhower (CVN-69) in Haiti as joint support platforms.
Without an air threat in the region, it was decided to employ the carriers as transports of Army aircraft and troops to the troubled island. 8 Freed from reliance upon strategic airlift, the Army forces also now had a base of operation available that wasn't dependent on host nation compliance.
Troop movements in Iraq again resulted in a carrier response in October of that year.
Instead of deploying to the Persian Gulf, the George Washington (CVN-73) supported
Operation Vigilant Warrior from the Red Sea. Iraqi tensions arose again in 1995, causing both the Lincoln and the Independence to respond to Operation Vigilant Sentinel in addition to their Southern Watch duties. 9 It was ultimately decided to retaliate by using the Lincoln battle group surface combatant's cruise missile capability, which kept American Naval Aviators and Aircrew out of potential danger.
That same year, Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and America again returned to Bosnia, helping to bring a fragile peace through Operation Deliberate Force. When the Italian government refused to allow F-117 deployment into their country to support Deliberate Force, reliance upon seaborne Naval Aviation became critical. 10 The Dayton
Accord followed, as did the insertion of UN peacekeeping troops -with air cover provided by the America.
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The China and Formosa standoff of 1996, brought to a head through well-advertised
Chinese military exercises, resulted in an American show of force and resolve similar to that provided in 1950 by the Valley Forge. Initially the Independence was sortied to the area while it was announced that Nimitz (CVN-68) was enroute from the Persian Gulf.
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Although Nimitz did not actually arrive until the Independence had departed the region, the media and others were convinced that it had been the entire time; the carrier-duo threat was noted by the region's adversaries, who promptly ceased carrying out their announced intentions.
Iraqi actions in 1996 once again resulted in retaliatory strikes against its infrastructure. This time the "Global Reach" theory was tested by using B-52
Stratofortresses to deliver air-launched cruise missiles. Operation Desert Strike could not provide for globe-girdling Air Force fighter escort of the bomber force, so the locally deployed Carl Vinson (CVN-70) provided fighter support through the troubled airspace.
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The Vinson battle group surface combatants were also quite capable of launching the same cruise missile attack as the B-52s, just as the Lincoln's cruisers had done the year The funded and under construction CVB-X design was to be the original "Super Carrier;" its displacement approached the size of the Nimitz class carrier as construction began in 1949.
2 On her giant keel, the largest ever laid to that date, was stamped "U.S.S.
United States (CVA-58)." In the first major Department of Defense inter-service skirmish, the Navy's senior leadership took drastic and career-ending political steps in their failed attempt to keep the CVB-X program alive. The debate centered over a problem that continues to resurface occasionally between the Navy and the Air Forceduplication of missions. Revolving around the role of the Air Force's new B-36 intercontinental bomber, this political clash argued that the CVB-X concept was simply a duplication of the Air Force's strategic nuclear weapon delivery mission.
The CVB-X and the B-36 were both approved and funded -their mutual coexistence was not an issue until the services chose to make it one. Parochial concerns over whether the CVB-X would duplicate the Peacemaker's nuclear mission were brought to the attention of newly World War II), the memorandum was certainly not the official stance taken by the Navy.
This paper nevertheless represented the view of much of Naval Aviation's leadership and was perceived by the Air Force to threaten that two year-old service's very existence.
Some within the upper ranks of Navy leadership were concerned that the fledging Air Force would usurp the Navy's aviation role and, in particular, its carriers. Hard lines were drawn in the sand with the exposed memorandum's conclusion of "the major missions of the Navy and Air Force should be as follows:
Navy: The delivery of an atomic attack on the capitol and industrial centers of the enemy. Secondary mission: Control of the seas. This was a reckless destruction of the extremely delicate balances which his predecessor [Forrestal] had been at such pains to establish. Secretary Johnson may have felt that he had logic on his side, but military growth and development are not logical processes. Soldiers, no less than lawyers, priests or doctors, are human; and the great institutions over which they all preside are organic rather than mechanical growths. Forrestal sensed this fact; Johnson scorned it and the immediate result was the envenomed 'B-36 controversy' between the Navy and the Air Force, with the former retaliating for the loss of its supercarrier by assailing the latter's newest superbomber as a failure. The decision to cancel CVA-58, because of the perceived nuclear delivery duplication, had deep reaching effects in Naval Aviation. Fortunately, the funding for the United States was in turn reapportioned to improve and modify existing carriers as the Navy entered the jet age. This would soon prove vital as tensions in Korea mounted.
Despite the CVB-X cancellation, the Navy was still burdened with a nuclear delivery mission. That mission and the introduction of jet aircraft aboard ship furthered the implementation of new developments onto the smaller decked Essex and Midway classes.
Wartime operations in Korea were soon to provide the hard-won experience necessary to facilitate jet operations at sea. 
Global Reach in the 1950s
The Navy is on its way out…the Air Force can do anything the Navy can nowadays. continued throughout the war, even after CAS capable jets eventually arrived in theater.
The jet pilots who suddenly found themselves back in the older Mustangs "had seen vivid demonstrations of why the F-51 was not a ground-support fighter in the last war, and weren't exactly intrigued by the thought of playing guinea pig to prove the same thing over again." 
Even improved B-29
Superfortresses, known as B-50s, were kept from the theater -one B-50 squadron was forced to relinquish their bombers and exchange them for old B-29s that has been in storage and suffered from chronic mechanical problems. Lamented one crewmember, "We got the feeling that the USAF just didn't want to waste its first-line equipment over -CDR Robert "Levi" Paredes, USN, 1996 No discussion of Air Force and Naval assets is complete without addressing the tireless issue of aircraft carrier survivability. The classic carrier proponent argument is that no aircraft carrier built during or since World War II has been sunk in combat. (A few were sunk in tests after World War II when hydrogen bombs were dropped on them while at anchor. Many ships not used, as "ground zero" in those tests remained seaworthy, if radioactive.)
Conversely, the carrier antagonist argument has been that the carrier does not have to be sunk; it merely has to be damaged to the point where it can no longer maintain flight operations.
While it is true that a "soft kill" can be obtained on most weapon systems, that in itself should not be considered grounds to invalidate that weapon's usefulness. If that method of reasoning had been applied after the horrible losses suffered by the 8th Air
Force during the 1943 Regensburg raids -later referred to as "complete failures" by General "Hap" Arnold -would we have a bomber force today?
1 Congressional research projects have evaluated the survivability of aircraft carriers; one such study was conducted in the heyday of the Cold War when the political assumption of the era was that nuclear war would be the final showdown in a "superpower" conflict. The weak conclusion was that the carrier would survive in a roundabout way; the analysis decided that carriers will readily survive small-scale battles, but are quite vulnerable to nuclear attack.
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While concluding that an aircraft carrier would not survive such an attack, it noted that no other military installation would fare any better. Unmentioned is the CVN's capability of traveling nearly 1000 miles in a 24 hour period; poorly addressed is the fact that 90,000 tons of maneuvering, radioactivity-resisting steel is harder to locate and kill than any easily targeted hardened bunker, building or tent.
With the nuclear threat diminished today, at least as it was envisioned during the Cold War, the "Weapons of Mass Destruction" concern has shifted to chemical and biological devices. Sometimes referred to as a "poor man's atomic bombs," these weapons possess all the killing power of nuclear weapons with few destructive or lingering fallout-type effects.
This kind of threat also highlights the advantages of the carrier's open sea mobility rather than the fixed latitude and longitude of installations such as the barracks previously located, before their regrettable destruction, at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia or in Beirut, Lebanon. Even if chemical weapons are successfully delivered in an attack against a carrier, the unique ability of the carrier to seal its hatches and secure ambient ventilation is an often-rehearsed contingency that the carrier can readily survive.
External sprinkling systems then wash away residual chemicals while the carrier sails to a clear area in preparation for the resumption of flight operations. This assumes that a threat had been able to target the underway carrier in the first place.
Remembering that no carrier has been sunk since those built before World War II, the claim that carriers receiving notable damage are unable to fight again for months while undergoing repair deserves closer scrutiny. This argument has little historical fact to support it. Allowing an analogy between modern anti-ship missile attack and World
War II Kamikaze raids, Essex class carriers hit by these types weapons were often launching and recovering aircraft again in less than two hours. Of course, this was not always the case -some severely damaged carriers were out of action for months. They were able to retire from battle and conduct repair, unlike the original Air Force Base in
Vietnam at Bien Hoa. When this facility was first mortared in 1964, killing servicemen and destroying aircraft, the facility remained under the threat of attack for the duration of America's participation in that war.
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The accidental flight deck fire aboard Enterprise in 1969 is often used as an example of aircraft carrier vulnerability. While recognizing that fire-fighting lessons learned from previous Vietnam flight deck fires were successfully employed to bring the disaster under control in less than an hour, one critic concluded that Enterprise was out of action for ten weeks. 4 In fact, Enterprise was capable of flight operations even while the fire fighting effort was being waged. Despite the nine Mk-82 bombs that detonated on her flight deck, the catapults and arresting gear were undamaged; the debris from the disaster need only have been removed to resume flight operations. 5 The fact that the conscious decision was made to remove the damaged Enterprise from the front lines should not be confused with a requirement to do so.
The contention that USAF bases and facilities cannot be damaged in the same fashion that carriers might be isn't always correct. The perception that the carrier's close quarters requirement of storing fuel and munitions will necessarily result in a degree of damage greater than the destruction that land bases would be subjected to is misguided.
It has been nearly thirty years since the last major shipboard conflagration resulted in a carrier retiring from its mission. 
Conclusions
In conclusion, an historical argument for the continued development and employment of the modern aircraft carrier exists.
Much is made today of the theory of power projection across the globe from the United States; this unproven concept is yet again being offered as a replacement to the time proven capabilities of the carrier fleet. Little is said of these same promises having been historically broken, despite having both global and regional assets available for that mission.
Regardless, this theory offers little in the politically vital spectrum of forward presence. A Stealth bomber in an environmentally controlled hangar far from the public eye does not offer the political credibility or provide for a demonstration of national will in troubled areas on the other side of the planet. Only an aircraft carrier battle group conducting day and night flight operations off an adversary's coast can provide this sort of presence.
Historical examples of the hundreds of times that the carrier has performed this mission make a strong case for this argument. The Great White Fleet did not impress emerging Japan while it sat pier side in Norfolk. The victorious naval armada sitting at anchor in Tokyo Bay in 1945 remains an internationally unforgettable sight to this day.
Every president since World War II has used aircraft carrier battle groups to maintain or regain the peace. No president has ever called upon the independent use of a bomber force to project power outside times of war; this force has only been employed when in concert with other forces.
The facts behind the failure of the U.S.S. United States to survive the political gauntlet should be absorbed and applied to prevent this fate from repeating itself with the CVX concept. The actual argumentative points made in 1949 were valid, but political events and misconceptions superceded them. The fact that the super carrier concept was validated in the following months should provide the required political motivation to never again repeat that mistake. The approval and funding of the Forrestal class by some of the very antagonists that cancelled the United States set a historical precedent that common sense will dictate to be difficult to overcome.
Aircraft carrier survivability remains a favorite argument used by carrier antagonists.
This complaint is often heard despite the fact that no carrier has been grievously damaged in over thirty years. Modern carrier construction, fire fighting systems and damage control techniques that are being used today prove this argument far less valid than the claim of the invincibility of stationary targets.
The mobility and unpredictability of the aircraft carrier actually make its wartime survival an asset that no land based system can duplicate. The mere fact that no hostile force has inflicted damage onto an aircraft carrier in over half a century, regardless of a state of war or intent, is justification in itself for the continuation of carrier development.
Lastly, the adaptability of modern carriers must continue to grow with the everexpanding peacekeeping missions that America routinely accepts. Whether the requirement is for a standard carrier air wing, a wing with Army or Marine helicopters added or a futuristic asset, carriers must continue to develop new roles by constantly demonstrating their flexibility regardless of the situation.
Aircraft carriers have survived to this date because of the contribution they have historically made in the vast majority of America's conflicts. Whether supplying air power to a theater commander, forcing deterrence through forward presence, evacuating hostages of terrorism or disaster or by using its evolving internal assets on peacekeeping missions, the aircraft carrier continues to provide flexible solutions to America's overseas problems. 
Glossary
